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Consciousness and Cognition 12 (2003) 513–514Response to Phil GerransqPhil Gerranss comments raise two interesting points. One has to do with the value of sceptical
arguments, the other with what a self can know of himself.
1. A proposal aiming at oﬀering a ‘‘reduplication-proof’’ approach of the self is mainly inspired
by sceptical worries, Gerrans writes; providing a dynamic criterion does not help however to allay
these worries, because dynamic memory can also be replicated. Before coming to this point, a
prior question needs to be raised: why is reduplication a problem? In my opinion, the problem is
not simply of addressing a general sceptical worry—is one justiﬁed in believing that one knows
what a self is, if one does not know how a self is at all identiﬁable? The problem is rather to take a
stance on the reality of individual selves, independently of what we can know about them. This
issue is addressed in the literature on the basis of a dilemma. Either selves are deﬁned as structured
bundles of representations, and can ‘‘essentially’’ be copied (as a matter of deﬁnition). Or selves
have an additional, non-representational, property securing numerical identity on a conceptual
basis. Inﬂuential naturalistic views tend to chose the ﬁrst horn of the dilemma (such as Dennett,
1991), while the second horn is generally selected in non-reductionist views on the self (Campbell,
1994). I suggest that the alternative is not forced on us. One can be a reductionist about the self,
and explain what a person is in more fundamental terms (taking the ﬁrst horn of the dilemma),
while also recognizing that the self is a numerically unique entity.
My proposal is that the additional property on which numerical identity depends consists in a
disposition to reﬂexive aﬀection that pertains to a class of minds. What reﬂexive aﬀection achieves
is revising the workings of this mind on the basis of prior learning. The indexical nature of the
targetted system expresses the fact that revision operates on a set of token states whose properties
have to be monitored and adjusted. We can compare the twin-earth fates of two replicae in the
Leibnizian anti-Locke story and in the present view. Although prior learning is indeed subject to
duplication, insofar as dynamic memory, functionally conceived, allows type-copying—as Ger-
rans correctly observes-, metacognition targets on token-mental/cerebral operations in a way that
is not purely representational. Metacognition operates both on content (mental states) and on
vehicle (cerebral states). If you duplicate a metacognitive organism, the replica will immediately
get busy adjusting her own states using her own connectivity. If several replicae are created with a
same learning background and a functionally similar mental organization, it will leave each
replica with her own numerical identity. In other words, one might say that reduplication of suchqReply to Commentary on Proust, J. (2003). Thinking of oneself as the same. Consciousness and Cognition, 12, 495–
509. This article is part of a special issue of this journal on Self and Action.
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result of the very structure of metacognition.
2. A naturalist philosopher obviously must confront the problem of what a person can know of
herself. Gerrans comments on the fact that a forward model ‘‘has no access to its own states.’’
What does this expression mean exactly? A disturbance can only be appreciated by a forward
control system if it can map its own commands to a particular environment, and retrieve infor-
mation from the reaﬀerences. Such perception monitoring cannot be achieved if the control
system has no informational access to various other mental and bodily states (e.g., sense of
knowing, head, trunk, and limb position). Now of course, the self is not to be confused with a
controlling agent. The self does not exert control, it is constituted by a speciﬁc level of the control
capacity—the social level, or the long-term evaluative level. Expressions such as ‘‘the self is
aware,’’ or ‘‘the self is in charge. . .’’ suggests that the self does something, acts in order to
eliminate or coordinate. In fact, these expressions invite the homuncular fallacy.
But maybe Gerrans is rather attracting our attention to the fact that, given the architecture of a
control system, the self-control loop cannot locate itself in a contrast space of other selves, be-
cause all it monitors is the contrast space of plans. How can we get over this limitation? In the
present paper, it is suggested that, if access to oneself is understood through domain speciﬁc
monitoring, as in any other control level, no higher level is required: accessing the self is simply
getting reaﬀerences from ones ability to select, execute, and revise plans of action. Explicit self-
narratives do not need to be imagined for selves to come to existence. Nor is it necessary for
accessing oneself that one models a group of selves with alternative evaluative and dynamic
properties. Obviously, watching others—cooperating with them, obeying them, rebelling against
them—allows social experience to build up. Metarepresentational capacities may develop, helping
the individual make explicit the reﬂexivity that is implicit in the control structure.1 But there is no
need to have an additional control loop inside our mind to develop self-awareness. Such a loop
does develop of course, but outside the individuals brain; specialized institutions (sets of repre-
sentations and practices) have the function of controlling and monitoring the control systems in
which selves consist—harnessing them to each other in a normative hierarchy, distributing their
respective goals and values, and constraining revisions accordingly. The reaﬀerences consist in
verbal and emotional reactions and social rewards as structured by the norms in a speciﬁc culture
with speciﬁc institutions. As Gerrans observes, reward is crucial at each control level.References
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